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The Re-emergence of a Clash of 
Rights: A Critical Analysis of the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s Decision 
in R. v. S. (N.) 
Ranjan K. Agarwal and Carlo Di Carlo* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Your liberty to swing your fist ends just where my nose begins.” 
— Oliver Wendell Holmes, former Justice of the  
Supreme Court of the United States 
Courts and scholars alike have recognized the difficulty of defining 
the limits of rights. As the quote above suggests, the principle for these 
limits is easy and even, in some regards, obvious — an individual’s 
exercise of his or her freedoms should not deprive others of their 
freedoms. Striking this balance in practice, however, is difficult.  
In R. v. S. (N.),1 the Supreme Court of Canada confronted this 
difficulty. This matter forced the Supreme Court to balance the 
complainant’s freedom of religious belief to wear a niqab while 
testifying against the defendants’ right to a full defence. The Court 
articulated four factors to consider in resolving this conflict of rights. The 
majority decision prescribes a “contextual balancing”2 of the two rights 
that will strive to respect both.  
                                                                                                             
* Ranjan Agarwal and Carlo Di Carlo are lawyers in Bennett Jones LLP’s litigation department 
in Toronto. Ranjan was counsel to the intervener South Asian Legal Clinic of Ontario in R. v. S. (N.). 
1 [2012] S.C.J. No. 72, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 726 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “N.S.”]. 
2 Id., at para. 47. This is the only reference in the majority decision to its approach being 
“contextual”. 
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However, the balancing approach taken by the majority in N.S. 
represents a subtle shift in the case law from reconciling rights to 
balancing rights. Justice Iacobucci’s extra-judicial articulation of the 
distinction assists in understanding this shift in case law. In his article,3 
he argues that the Supreme Court’s case law regarding conflicting rights 
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms4 has strove to 
reconcile ostensibly conflicting rights by properly defining or 
circumscribing the scope of these rights according to context. According 
to the reconciliation approach, the rights are understood in a manner 
wherein both are simultaneously respected and rendered compatible. In 
contrast, in N.S., the Court sought to balance (as Iacobucci J. refers to the 
term) the two competing rights. The reasons of the majority (to an extent, 
of all the reasons) used a contextual approach to identify situations where 
one right would have primacy over the other. Despite its statements to 
the contrary, the logic of the majority’s reasons implicitly assumes that, 
depending on context, each of the impugned rights must be enjoyed to 
their full extent, or not at all. This stands in stark contrast to the 
compatibility between rights that cases before N.S. required.  
This paper will articulate the difference between the balancing and 
reconciliation approach to competing rights claims. It will then 
demonstrate how the majority’s reasons fall into the camp of the former 
and thus represent a subtle, yet important conceptual shift from the 
jurisprudence. Further, this paper will argue that the framework used 
by the Supreme Court in N.S. is inappropriate, and may have led to the 
shift from reconciliation to balance. Finally, it will consider some of 
the practical implications of the decision which may be connected to 
the court’s balancing approach, namely: (a) the majority’s 
insensitivity to the procedural burdens that its test will cause 
complainants; (b) the problems that demonstrating strength of belief 
may cause for complainants; and (c) the fact that the decision may create 
an access to justice issue. 
                                                                                                             
3 Hon. Frank Iacobucci, “‘Reconciling Rights’: The Supreme Court of Canada’s Approach 
to Competing Charter Rights” (2003) 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 137 [hereinafter “Iacobucci, ‘Reconciling 
Rights’”]. 
4 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
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II. RECONCILING RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
1. The Press Freedom Cases 
In 1994, barely 10 years after the Charter was proclaimed in force, 
the Supreme Court of Canada grappled with the issue of competing 
rights in the first of a series of press freedom cases. In December 1992, 
the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (“CBC”) intended to broadcast 
The Boys of St. Vincent, a fictional mini-series about sexual and physical 
abuse of children in a Catholic institution. Four former or current 
members of the Christian Brothers, a Catholic religious order who were 
charged with sexually and physically abusing children, sought an 
injunction restraining CBC from broadcasting the program until the end 
of their trials. The application judge and the Court of Appeal for Ontario 
granted the injunction.5 The CBC appealed the decision to the Supreme 
Court of Canada.  
The competing rights in this case were CBC’s freedom of the 
press, which is protected by section 2(b) of the Charter, and the 
respondents’ right to a fair trial, which is protected by sections 7 and 
11(d). The CBC was not challenging a statute or legislation that, for 
example, requires a judge to order a publication ban. Instead, it was 
challenging the court’s discretion to order a publication ban in 
certain circumstances.6 As such, the common law test for issuing a 
publication ban and the traditional section 2(b) and section 1 
framework needed to be modified. The majority (Lamer C.J.C. and 
Sopinka, Cory, Iacobucci and Major JJ. and La Forest J. on this issue) 
developed the following approach: 
A publication ban should only be ordered when: 
(a) Such a ban is necessary in order to prevent a real and substantial 
risk to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably available 
alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and 
(b) The salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious 
effects to the free expression of those affected by the ban. 
                                                                                                             
5 Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 
(S.C.C.), revg [1992] O.J. No. 2703, 12 O.R. (3d) 239 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Dagenais”]. 
6 Id., at 874-75. 
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If the ban fails to meet this standard (which clearly reflects the 
substance of the Oakes test applicable when assessing legislation under 
s. 1 of the Charter), then, in making the order, the judge committed an 
error of law and the challenge to the order on this basis should be 
successful.7 
This approach required, in its application, consideration of “the 
objective of the order, to examine the availability of reasonable 
alternative measures that could achieve this objective, and to consider 
whether the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the 
deleterious impact the ban has on freedom of expression”.8 The majority 
ultimately held that the publication ban was overbroad (because it 
prohibited broadcast throughout Canada and banned reporting on the ban 
itself)9 and, as such, failed the analytical framework established by the 
Court. 
The Post-Dagenais decisions utilized its framework and principles to 
resolve other conflicts of rights. The emphasis continued to be on using 
context to understand the proper scope of the rights and reconciling any 
apparent incompatibilities. 
In R. v. Mills,10 the Supreme Court relied on Dagenais to negotiate a 
conflict between an accused’s right to a full defence and the 
complainant’s privacy rights. Mills is an example of the Supreme Court 
using context to define the content of conflicting rights in a compatible 
manner. The accused was charged with one count of sexual assault and 
one count of unlawful sexual touching. At issue were provisions of the 
Criminal Code11 governing third party productions of records of 
complainants or witnesses in sexual assault proceedings. The accused 
alleged that these provisions violated his right to a full defence under 
sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.  
The Supreme Court began its analysis of this conflict by noting that 
neither the accused’s right to a full defence nor the complainant’s right to 
privacy “can be defined in such a way as to negate the other”.12 The 
Court, commenting on the impact of Dagenais on this analysis, noted: 
                                                                                                             
7 Id., at 878 (emphasis added). 
8 Id. 
9 Id., at 881. 
10 [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mills”]. 
11 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
12 Supra, note 9, at para. 17. 
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As this Court’s decision in Dagenais, supra, makes clear, Charter 
rights must be examined in a contextual manner to resolve conflicts 
between them. Therefore, unlike s. 1 balancing, where societal interests 
are sometimes allowed to override Charter rights, under s. 7 rights 
must be defined so that they do not conflict with each other. The rights 
of full answer and defence, and privacy, must be defined in light of 
each other. …13 
According to this approach, courts must take a contextual approach 
in determining the scope of rights. The Court stated that rights “often 
inform” and “are informed by” other rights or interests at play in 
particular circumstances.14 This view is consistent with Iacobucci J.’s 
articulation of rights (discussed below) not existing in the abstract — 
only circumstances can determine their content and scope. Applying this 
approach, the Court in Mills held that the impugned provisions were 
constitutional. 
The contextual approach to defining the content of rights was also 
apparent in Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of 
Teachers.15 Trinity Western University (“TWU”), a private teaching 
institution affiliated with the Evangelical Free Church of Canada, applied 
for permission to assume full responsibility for its teacher training 
program. The British Columbia College of Teachers refused this 
application on the grounds that TWU followed discriminatory practices. 
All of the staff and students at TWU had to adhere to the TWU 
Community Standards, which prohibited a list of practices that were 
“biblically condemned”, including homosexual behaviour. 
The Supreme Court characterized the issue at the “heart of this 
appeal” as reconciling the religious freedoms of individuals wishing to 
attend TWU with the equality concerns of students in B.C.’s public school 
system.16 The Court held that this conflict should be resolved through the 
“proper delineation” of the rights involved: “properly defining the scope 
of the rights avoids a conflict in this case”.17 The Court noted that all 
freedoms are “inherently limited by the rights and freedoms  
of others”.18 The Supreme Court reconciled the rights involved in this 
                                                                                                             
13 Id., at para. 21. 
14 Id., at para. 61. 
15 [2001] S.C.J. No. 32, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “TWU”]. 
16 Id., at para. 28. 
17 Id., at para. 29. 
18 Id. 
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case by circumscribing the freedom of religion of TWU attendees to 
holding their beliefs.19 By limiting the scope of religious freedom 
according to the context in which they are sought to be used, the Supreme 
Court was able to resolve the conflict in a manner that respected both of 
the competing values at stake. 
In R. v. Mentuck,20 which was decided the same year, the Court 
revisited the Dagenais framework. In Mentuck, the accused was 
charged with second degree murder of a 14-year-old girl. At his first 
trial in 1998, the charges were stayed after crucial evidence was ruled 
inadmissible. After the trial, the RCMP engaged in an undercover 
operation targeting the accused, which led to the Crown reinstating 
the indictment. During the trial, the Crown sought a publication ban 
of information regarding the undercover operation. The trial judge 
granted a partial ban. The accused appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada, which granted a temporary but full ban. The accused was 
eventually convicted. 
Mentuck differs from Dagenais in that neither party was asserting a 
freedom of the press interest (though two media organizations did in 
their capacity as interveners). In Mentuck, the accused wanted the 
information disclosed to protect his fair trial rights under sections 7 and 
11(d) of the Charter where the Crown sought the ban to “protect the 
safety of police officers and preserve the efficacy of undercover police 
operations”21 (which is protected by the interest in the “proper 
administration of justice”).22 As such, the Court, in a unanimous 
decision, restated the Dagenais test to apply to cases where interests 
other than the freedom of the press are at issue: 
A publication ban should only be ordered when: 
(a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the 
proper administration of justice because reasonably alternative 
measures will not prevent the risk; and 
(b) the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious 
effects on the rights and interests of the parties and the public, 
including the effects on the right to free expression, the right of the 
                                                                                                             
19 Id., at para. 37. 
20 [2001] S.C.J. No. 73, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442 (S.C.C.). 
21 Id., at para. 28. 
22 Id., at paras. 30, 33.  
(2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) THE RE-EMERGENCE OF A CLASH OF RIGHTS 149 
 
accused to a fair and public trial, and the efficacy of the 
administration of justice.23 
Using this test, the Court held that the trial judge’s partial ban was 
appropriate in scope and given the Charter interests. 
The Dagenais/Mentuck test was applied most recently (other than in 
N.S.) in B. (A.) v. Bragg Communications Inc.24 In that case, AB, a minor, 
alleged that she was defamed online. She sought an order allowing her to 
bring her civil action anonymously and seal certain parts of the court file 
that might identify her. The rights or interests engaged in B. (A.) differ 
from both Dagenais and Mentuck: the media organizations that opposed 
the order relied on the open court principle, whereas AB relied on the 
harm to her privacy.25 Justice Abella, writing for a unanimous Court, 
described the applicable test as follows: 
The inquiry is into whether each of these measures is necessary to 
protect an important legal interest and impairs free expression as 
little as possible. If alternative measures can just as effectively 
protect the interests engaged, the restriction is unjustified. If no such 
alternatives exist, the inquiry turns to whether the proper balance 
was struck between the open court principle and the privacy rights of 
the girl. ...26  
The Court concluded that the benefit of protecting AB’s identity 
outweighed any risks to the open court principle.27 
2. “Reconciling Rights” 
In 2003, Iacobucci J. (as he was then) consolidated the jurisprudence 
at the time in his article “‘Reconciling Rights’: The Supreme Court of 
Canada’s Approach to Competing Charter Rights”.28 Justice Iacobucci’s 
article makes the following points: 
                                                                                                             
23 Id., at para. 32. 
24 [2012] S.C.J. No. 46, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 567 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “B. (A.)”]. The co-author 
Ranjan Agarwal was co-counsel to the Canadian UNICEF Committee, an intervener in this appeal. 
25 Id., at para. 11. 
26 Id. 
27 Id., at para. 29. 
28 Iacobucci, “Reconciling Rights”, supra, note 3. 
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• “[N]o Charter right is absolute” and “there is no hierarchy of rights 
in the Charter.”29 Justice Iacobucci argues that the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed that no one Charter 
right is supreme over any other Charter right. 
• “Charter rights are not defined in abstraction, but rather in the 
particular factual matrix in which they arise.”30 In a competing rights 
case, there is no Charter violation, so the courts must examine “the 
underlying interests at stake as reflected in the Charter provisions at 
play”31 in trying to reconcile those rights. As a result, there may be 
different relationships between different rights in different contexts.32 
For this same reason, the reconciliation analysis must be flexible, 
which is evidenced by the restatement in Mentuck.33 
• The “more correct term” for dealing with competing rights claims is 
“reconcile” as opposed to “balance”. As Iacobucci J. states, “The 
exercise in which courts engage when they define the content and 
scope of rights in relation to one another, more closely approximates 
rights ‘reconciliation’ than rights ‘balancing’. The latter term, which 
connotes assigning primacy to one right over another right or interest 
after having weighed the relevant considerations, is customarily used 
in section 1 Oakes test jurisprudence and is perhaps better suited to 
that sort of analysis.”34  
• In the same vein, the “clash” or “conflict” of rights imagery should 
be avoided. Justice Iacobucci argues that rights may not always be in 
conflict, especially where the court can reconcile them.35 
• Because conflicting rights cases involve two individuals’ 
constitutionally guaranteed rights (as opposed to the state justifying a 
violation of an individual’s rights), “there is no rule about onus per 
se”.36 Justice Iacobucci argues that the party making the allegation 
                                                                                                             
29 Id., at 139. 
30 Id., at 141. 
31 Id., at 144. 
32 Id., at 156. 
33 Id., at 161. 
34 Id., at 142. See also R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Oakes”]. 
35 Iacobucci, “Reconciling Rights”, supra, note 3, at 159. 
36 Id., at 142. 
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bears the burden of demonstrating the need for modification but, 
then, the judiciary bears the burden of reconciling the rights. 
• The “proportionality” framework used in the section 1 analysis is 
appropriate for reconciling competing rights. This framework 
ensures that the court’s discretion is not applied arbitrarily or 
unfettered.37 
• The reconciliation of rights serves two purposes: (a) it facilitates a 
dialogue between the legislature and the courts; and (b) it ensures 
that the common law accords with Charter values.38 
Justice Iacobucci’s article was cited by the Court of Appeal for 
Ontario in N.S. In doing so, the Court of Appeal emphasized the 
“reconciliation” part of the Dagenais/Mentuck framework (“reasonably 
alternative measures will not prevent the risk”), which did not have as 
much prominence in other cases. 
3. Human Rights Approach 
In January 2012, the Ontario Human Rights Commission formulated 
its “Policy on Competing Human Rights”.39 Though this Policy is not 
necessarily relevant to Charter jurisprudence, it provides another view on 
the task of reconciling competing rights (in this case, statutory human 
rights, which deal with equality and discrimination). The Policy 
describes competing human rights as involving “situations where parties 
to a dispute claim that the enjoyment of an individual or group’s human 
rights and freedoms, as protected by law, would interfere with another’s 
rights and freedoms”. The Policy affirms many of the same principles 
identified by Iacobucci J.: no rights are absolute; there is no hierarchy of 
rights; and the full context, facts and constitutional values at stake must 
be considered. 
The Policy applies a process for addressing competing human rights 
complaints that is similar to the Dagenais/Mentuck framework: 
                                                                                                             
37 Id., at 158. 
38 Id., at 161-64. 
39 Ontario Human Rights Commission, “Policy on Competing Human Rights” (January 26, 
2012), online: OHRC <http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/policy-competing-human-rights> [hereinafter “Policy”]. 
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Stage One: Recognizing competing rights claims 
Step 1: What are the claims about? 
Step 2: Do claims connect to legitimate rights?  
(a) Do claims involve individuals or groups rather than operational 
interests? 
(b) Do claims connect to human rights, other legal entitlements or 
bona fide reasonable interests?  
(c) Do claims fall within the scope of the right when defined in 
context?  
Step 3: Do claims amount to more than minimal interference with 
rights?  
Stage Two: Reconciling competing rights claims 
Step 4: Is there a solution that allows enjoyment of each right? 
Step 5: If not, is there a “next best” solution? 
Stage Three: Making decisions  
• Decisions must be consistent with human rights and other laws, 
court decisions, human rights principles and have regard for 
OHRC policy  
• At least one claim must fall under the Ontario Human Rights 
Code40 to be actionable at the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario41 
In practice, it is not clear whether competing statutory rights are, in 
fact, “reconciled” as Iacobucci J. recommends or the Policy suggests. 
Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. Christian Horizons42 is the 
leading “competing rights” decision under the Ontario Code. In that case, 
Christian Horizons, an Evangelical Christian organization that operated 
residential homes and camps, disciplined a support worker for violating 
its “Life Style and Morality Statement” by being in a same-sex 
relationship. Christian Horizons relied on section 24(1) of the Ontario 
Code, which allows religious organizations “primarily engaged in 
serving the interests of persons identified by their … creed” to give 
                                                                                                             
40 R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 [hereinafter “Ontario Code”]. 
41 Policy, supra, note 39. 
42 [2010] O.J. No. 2059, 102 O.R. (3d) 267 (Ont. Div. Ct.). 
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preference to similarly identified individuals if that qualification is 
reasonable and bona fide. The Divisional Court held that Christian 
Horizons could not rely on this defence because support workers do not 
do any tasks that require an adherence to Evangelical Christian beliefs.43 
There was no analysis, either by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario 
or the Divisional Court, as to solutions that would allow both the support 
worker and her employer to enjoy their respective rights. 
The Tribunal’s jurisprudence on competing rights44 seems to suffer 
from the same frailty as N.S. and other cases in this area (which we 
develop below): if the courts cannot reconcile the competing rights, one 
of the rights will trump the other, which undermines the Supreme 
Court’s, Iacobucci J.’s and the Commission’s admonishment that no one 
right is absolute or supreme. 
III. N.S. 
1. Facts45 
NS alleged that her uncle and cousin repeatedly sexually assaulted 
her from 1982, when she was a six-year-old girl, until 1987. In 1992, NS 
revealed the assaults to her teacher and immediate family. The police 
investigated the matter. Ultimately, at the insistence of NS’s father, the 
police did not lay any charges. In 2007, when NS was 32, she revived her 
allegations of sexual assault against her uncle and her cousin. Both of the 
accused were charged with various sexual offences. 
NS is a Muslim woman who chooses to wear a veil or niqab. The 
niqab covers her entire face except her eyes. NS gave evidence that, in 
accordance with her faith, she always wore her niqab in public. She 
testified that she was only without her niqab when she was: (a) not in 
public; and (b) around immediate family, women or children. At the time 
of the commencement of the proceedings, NS had been wearing the 
niqab for approximately five years. 
                                                                                                             
43 Id., at paras. 104-105. 
44 See, e.g., Kacan v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [2012] O.H.R.T.D. 
No. 1340, [2012] CLLC ¶220-051 (Ont. H.R.T.); Taylor-Baptiste v. Ontario Public Service 
Employees Union, [2012] O.H.R.T.D. No. 1336, 1 C.C.E.L. (4th) 104 (Ont. H.R.T.), affd [2013] 
O.H.R.T.D. No. 179, 2013 HRTO 180 (Ont. H.R.T.). 
45 This summary of the facts relies on R. v. S. (N.), [2010] O.J. No. 4306, 102 O.R. (3d) 
161, at paras. 2-3, 5 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “N.S. CA”]. 
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2. Preliminary Examination 
At the preliminary inquiry, both accused sought an order requiring 
NS to remove her niqab when testifying. The defendants argued that the 
niqab would interfere with their counsel’s ability to cross-examine NS 
and thus make full answer and defence. The preliminary inquiry judge 
held a voir dire to determine this issue. Before the preliminary inquiry 
judge began his informal questioning of NS, Crown counsel (twice) 
provided its “strong position” that NS be entitled to independent legal 
advice before testifying.46 Despite this submission, the judge elected to 
proceed immediately with the informal questioning. NS wore her niqab 
during the voir dire. 
The judge’s stated aim was to understand the basis of NS’s objection 
to removing her niqab. During his questioning, NS made it clear that her 
objection to removing the veil was “very strong” and that the basis of her 
objection was her religious faith.47 NS also stated: “I would feel a lot 
more comfortable if I didn’t have to, you know, reveal my face. You 
know, just considering the nature of the case and the nature of the 
allegations. …”48 After this exchange, the judge decided that NS should 
have independent counsel and adjourned the matter.  
At the next appearance, the defendants’ counsel submitted that, at the 
previous hearing, the judge had failed to question NS about whether or 
not she made any exceptions to wearing a niqab.49 In particular, the 
defendants’ counsel had learned from the officer in charge that NS had a 
driver’s licence with her picture.50 The defendants’ counsel wanted NS to 
be recalled as a witness so that he could ask her if she had any exceptions 
and, in particular, whether she wore her niqab for her driver’s licence 
photo. During this testimony, NS confirmed that she was not wearing her 
niqab for her driver’s licence photo. She testified that the photograph had 
been taken by a female photographer behind a screen that prevented any 
                                                                                                             
46 Transcript of the Preliminary Inquiry before Weisman J., held on September 11, 2008, 
at 7, 8 [hereinafter “NS Transcript”]. 
47 Id., at 12. 
48 Id., at 13. 
49 Transcript of the Preliminary Inquiry before Wiseman J., held on October 16, 2008, at 
37 [hereinafter “Second NS Transcript”]. None of the parties filed the Second NS Transcript at 
the Court of Appeal. Consequently, the Court of Appeal noted that no evidence was called at the 
October Appearance (see N.S. CA, supra, note 45, at para. 6). However, the accused filed the 
Second NS Transcript at the Supreme Court of Canada.  
50 Id., at 36. 
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one else from seeing NS’s face.51 As the Court of Appeal noted, this fact 
took on “some significance” in the judge’s ruling.52 The judge found the 
fact that NS had a driver’s licence and would be required to produce it to 
“all sorts of males” to be inconsistent with the “strength” of NS’s 
religious beliefs.53 The judge concluded that NS’s preference to keep her 
niqab on was an issue of “comfort” and thus ordered that she remove her 
niqab before testifying.54 
NS applied to the Superior Court to quash the order of the 
preliminary inquiry judge. The Superior Court quashed the order and 
held that NS be permitted to testify wearing a niqab if she asserted a 
sincere religious reason for doing so. The Superior Court also held that 
the preliminary inquiry judge would have the option to exclude her 
evidence if the niqab was found to prevent true cross-examination. NS 
and one of the accused both appealed this decision. 
3. Court of Appeal 
The Court of Appeal held that a court facing a conflict of rights 
between the witness’s freedom of religion and the accused’s fair trial 
right, first must determine whether the witness’s request to wear a niqab 
was motivated by a sincere religious belief. If so, the court must next 
determine whether the request impinged upon the accused’s fair trial 
rights in a manner that was “more than minimal or insignificant”.55 If 
both of the rights are sufficiently engaged, then a court must look to the 
factual context in which these rights are to be applied in order to 
determine their content and to attempt to reconcile them. The court 
identified several contextual factors to consider in making this 
assessment, including: 
• the limited manner in which wearing the niqab interferes with the 
trier of fact’s assessment based on demeanour 
• whether it is a jury or judge-alone trial 
                                                                                                             
51 Id., at 42. 
52 N.S. CA, supra, note 45, at para. 6. 
53 R. v. S. (N.), [2009] O.J. No. 1766, 95 O.R. (3d) 735, at para. 98 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
54 Id. 
55 N.S. CA, supra, note 45, at para. 71. The court noted that minimal interference would not 
justify “any limitation on the witness’s exercise of her right to freedom of religion”. 
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• issues of access to justice 
• the nature of the proceeding 
• the nature of the evidence to be given (whether it is peripheral or 
whether the credibility of the witness will be central to the 
prosecution case) 
• the nature of the defence advanced 
• other constitutional values and societal interests56 
The court did not decide whether NS could wear her niqab. Instead, 
it returned the matter to the preliminary inquiry judge to be dealt with in 
accordance with its holding. Both NS and one of the accused appealed to 
the Supreme Court of Canada. 
4. Supreme Court of Canada 
The Supreme Court’s decision had three sets of reasons. All of the 
reasons would have returned the matter to the preliminary inquiry judge, 
but each with different directions regarding the niqab. This paper focuses 
on the majority decision.  
The concurring reasons of LeBel and Rothstein JJ. agreed with the 
conclusion of the majority to dismiss NS’s appeal. However, they would 
have created a “clear rule” that niqabs never be worn by witnesses.  
The basis of Abella J.’s dissent was her belief that depriving the 
accused of a portion of the demeanour evidence of the witness was not 
sufficiently impairing to the accused’s right to fair trial. In Abella J.’s 
assessment, requiring the removal of the niqab would cause tremendous 
harm, not only to the witness herself, but to society more generally. This 
contrasted with what she saw as the limited salutary benefits, given the 
questions that have arisen regarding the value of demeanour evidence, 
and the fact that only a small portion of demeanour evidence would be 
denied to the accused. 
The majority decision implemented the Dagenais/Mentuck 
framework for resolving rights conflicts. The majority applies this 
framework using four questions: 
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1. Would requiring the witness to remove the niqab while testifying 
interfere with her religious freedom? 
2. Would permitting the witness to wear the niqab while testifying 
create a serious risk to trial fairness? 
3. Is there a way to accommodate both rights and avoid the conflict 
between them? 
4. If no accommodation is possible, do the salutary effects of 
requiring the witness to remove the niqab outweigh the deleterious 
effects of doing so?57 
Although the Court does not explicitly say so, it would appear that 
once the witness establishes that she has a sincere religious reason to 
wear the niqab, the defendant would bear the onus of demonstrating the 
remaining factors (although the witness would also seem to have to 
produce evidence regarding accommodation).58 
Sincere Religious Belief: The majority reaffirmed the low threshold 
that exists for demonstrating sincerity of religious belief. The analysis is 
only to focus on sincerity of belief and not on strength. Past departures 
from the practice in question will not necessarily deny the witness the 
ability to raise freedom of religion arguments at trial.59 
Trial Unfairness: The Supreme Court held that the niqab would 
deprive the accused of an aspect of NS’s demeanour evidence. This 
would potentially affect two aspects of the accused’s fair trial rights: an 
effective cross-examination and the assessment of a witness’s credibility. 
The Supreme Court held that, absent evidence to the contrary, it was 
unwilling to disregard the common law’s “long-standing” assumption of 
the importance of demeanour evidence.60 
Reconciliation: The Court then held that if both of the rights are 
engaged, both parties must place evidence before the court relating to 
possible options for accommodation of the conflicting claims.61 Only if 
accommodation is impossible, would a court move on to the last factor.  
                                                                                                             
57 N.S., supra, note 1, at para. 9. 
58 Id., at para. 3. 
59 Id., at para. 13. 
60 Id., at para. 22. 
61 The Supreme Court’s approach to this issue has since been applied internationally. In 
September 2013, a United Kingdom trial judge, relying largely on the reasons in N.S., held that a 
defendant could wear her niqab in court but not while testifying. That being said, the court also made 
it clear that it “may use its inherent powers to do what it can to alleviate any discomfort, for example 
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The majority identifies some options (excluding men from the 
courtroom or testifying via closed-circuit television or behind a one-way 
screen) but, in the same paragraph, seems to assume that none of these 
options will be possible.62 The Court of Appeal identified others: the use 
of an all-female court staff and female judge; an order that a witness be 
cross-examined by female counsel; closing the court to all male persons 
other than the accused and counsel; calling on the witness to wear a style 
of niqab made with a kind of fabric that least interferes with the judge’s 
ability to assess her demeanour.63 
Proportionality: Most of the analysis is done at the last factor, where 
a court has to balance the salutary/deleterious effects of requiring NS to 
remove her niqab. At this stage, a court is to assess the strength of the 
witness’s religious beliefs as well as “broader societal harms” in 
determining the salutary effects of refusing to force a witness to remove 
her niqab. In terms of determining the deleterious effects, the court has to 
consider the potential harm done to the accused’s fair trial right by 
assessing factors such as the nature of the proceeding and the nature of the 
evidence given by the witness. This latter factor seems to be at the crux of 
the entire analysis. As the Supreme Court states: “[W]here the liberty of 
the accused is at stake, the witness’s evidence is central to the case and her 
credibility vital, the possibility of a wrongful conviction must weigh 
heavily in the balance, favouring removal of the niqab.”64 
In short, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada concludes that, in 
the absence of a reconciliation that protects both NS’s religious freedom and 
the accused’s right to a fair trial, NS’s religious beliefs have to give way. 
IV. ANALYZING N.S. 
1. Some Rights Are Absolute 
In our view, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada actually 
balanced NS’s and the accused’s rights notwithstanding the language of 
“reconciliation”. This view is demonstrated by a comparison to the Court 
                                                                                                             
by allowing the use of screens or allowing her to give evidence by live link”. The Queen  v.  D. (R.), 
[2013] EW Misc 13 (C.C.). 
62 N.S., supra, note 1, at para. 33. 
63 N.S. CA, supra, note 45, at paras. 85-86. 
64 N.S., supra, note 1, at para. 44. 
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of Appeal’s reasons, which discusses reconciliation more forcefully. 
The Court of Appeal noted that it was attempting to “reconcile the rights 
so that each is given full force and effect within the relevant context”.65 
Its treatment of the accused’s right to a full defence and fair trial is 
consistent with the reconciliation approach. The Court of Appeal’s 
conceptualization of the content of the accused’s right reflects the 
contextual analysis that this approach requires. It noted that not every 
limit on the right to cross-examination compromises trial fairness and 
that trial fairness is measured by reference to the “entirety of the 
process”.66 It stated: “The Charter focuses not on face to face 
confrontation per se, but on the effect of any limitation on that 
confrontation on the fairness of the trial. Fairness takes into account the 
interests of the accused, the witness and the broader societal concern that 
the process maintains public confidence.”67  
According to the Court of Appeal, whether being deprived of a 
face-to-face cross-examination will result in a loss of the constitutional 
right to make a full defence will depend on a “fact-specific” inquiry.68 
This inquiry, the court notes, “must” have regard to “other legitimate 
interests engaged in the circumstances”.69 In discussing the contextual 
factors that courts should consider, the Court of Appeal notes that one 
of these factors includes “the somewhat limited manner in which the 
wearing the niqab interferes with the trier of fact’s assessment based on 
demeanor”.70 The Court of Appeal’s reasons allow for the possibility 
that subsequent courts can circumscribe accused’s right to a fair trial 
and full defence by defining these rights in accordance with their 
context. This view is similar to what Iacobucci J. refers to as 
“definitional reconciliation”.71 It also consistent with the approach 
taken by the Supreme Court in prior case law. In TWU, the Supreme 
Court noted that “properly defining the scope of the rights avoids a 
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66 Id., at para. 51. 
67 Id., at para. 53. 
68 Id., at para. 60. 
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70 Id., at para. 73. The Court of Appeal continues: 
The trier of fact still hears and sees the witness. Tone of voice, eye movements, body 
language, and the manner in which the witness testifies, all important aspects of demeanour, 
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witness from being subjected to a vigorous and thorough cross-examination. 
71 Iacobucci, “Reconciling Rights”, supra, note 3, at 160. 
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conflict in this case”.72 Further, in his dissent in B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid 
Society of Metropolitan Toronto,73 Iacobucci J. avoided a conflict of 
rights by using context to restrict the scope of freedom of religion to 
exclude “the imposition upon a child of religious practices which 
threaten the safety, health or life of the child”.74 
The Supreme Court is much blunter in its approach to context and 
the scope of the parties’ rights. Although the decision requires courts to 
take a contextual analysis, the purpose of this analysis is different than 
that of the Court of Appeal. The majority’s reasons do not suggest the 
possibility of using context to limit the scope and content of a right. 
Instead, context is used to determine whether or not the right will apply. 
This results in a situation-based analysis, as becomes clear towards the 
end of the majority’s reasons, when the Supreme Court advises that in 
the absence of reconciliation, the witness’s niqab must come off. As 
such, the Court’s decision is far from contextual. Instead it suggests that 
when courts are dealing with witnesses in situations such as those faced 
by NS, they should order the removal of the niqab regardless of all other 
factors. This position becomes even clearer considering the skepticism 
the Court exhibits towards its own suggestions for accommodating NS’s 
religious requirements. 
This absolutist approach, which Iacobucci J. warned against, 
severely limits the impact of the contextual factors that the Supreme 
Court states a court should consider when making this decision.75 It also 
leads one to question how contextual the analysis is. In our view, there 
are several risks to this approach: 
• First, it arguably led the Supreme Court to be insensitive to some of 
the procedural burdens that complainants will have to face because 
of the majority’s reasons.  
• Second, it fails to appreciate the subjective nature of religious belief 
and of the freedom of religion analysis established in case law.  
                                                                                                             
72 TWU, supra, note 15, at para. 29. 
73 [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “B. (R.)”]. This case dealt 
with a conflict between the religious rights of parents and their child’s right to life under s. 7 of the 
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• Finally, it arguably caused the Supreme Court not to fully consider 
the impact its decision will have on access to justice for 
complainants in NS’s situation.  
A greater appreciation of the factual context would have led the Supreme 
Court to be more cognizant of these issues, and arrive at a holding that 
was more accessible. 
The majority’s discussion regarding the need for expert evidence also 
demonstrates that the Court was more interested in balancing rights than 
reconciling them. The majority states an unwillingness to limit an 
accused’s right to cross-examination without a record that shows the 
“long-standing assumptions of the common law regarding the importance 
of a witness’s facial expressions” to be unfounded.76 This suggests that 
absent social science evidence to the contrary, the accused’s right to fair 
trial and full defence inherently contains the right to a face-to-face 
confrontation during cross-examination.77 We question whether the 
Court’s distance from the everyday realities of trial led to this view: it is 
unreasonable to believe that a witness in NS’s socio-economic position 
would be able to commission the type of social science study that would 
undermine the “ancient and persistent connection the law has postulated 
between seeing a witness’s face and trial fairness”.78 
Further, this position implies that the right to full defence can be 
defined in abstraction.79 In contrast to the Court of Appeal, whose 
reasons suggest that the preliminary inquiry judge should look to context 
to determine the scope and content of the rights at play, the Supreme 
Court’s reasons suggest that rights have an inherent content. Context 
should only be used to determine whether or not this is a situation where 
the right can apply. This is indicative of the balancing approach to 
conflicting rights. 
Only Abella J.’s dissent suggests that context can determine the 
content of the accused’s rights: 
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I concede without reservation that seeing more of a witness’ facial 
expressions is better than seeing less. What I am not willing to concede, 
however, is that seeing less is so impairing of a judge’s or an accused’s 
ability to assess the credibility of a witness, that the complainant will 
have to choose between her religious rights and her ability to bear 
witness against an alleged aggressor. This also has the potential to 
impair the rights of an accused, who may find herself having to choose 
between her religious rights and giving evidence in her own defence.80 
Justice Abella’s approach to this issue considers “a number of 
interests”81 to determine the content of the accused’s rights in this matter, 
including:  
• the exclusionary impact of forcing a religious person to choose 
between their religious beliefs and their ability to participate in the 
justice system 
• the impact of such an order in the context of allegations of sexual 
assault 
• judicial note taken of the limited impact of demeanour evidence 
Overall, Abella J.’s dissent addresses this issue in a manner that is 
comparable to the definitional approach outlined by Iacobucci J. in B. 
(R.). Using context, she is defining the right in a circumscribed manner. 
Ultimately, Abella J. does not conceptualize her approach in a manner 
consistent with the reconciliation of rights. She is very clear that the 
“rights cannot be reconciled” and that she is balancing interests. In our 
view, this stated approach is a better reflection of the Court’s approach 
and provides better guidance to lower courts and counsel arguing these 
issues in subsequent cases.  
2. Is Dagenais/Mentuck Appropriate? 
The fact that all of the reasons in N.S. represent a subtle shift in the 
case law from reconciling rights to balancing them may suggest a need to 
reconsider further applications of the test established in Dagenais and 
Mentuck. Though the Supreme Court has applied the principles of 
Dagenais to a variety of contexts to inform decision-making, generally 
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the Court has restricted its application of its three-part test (necessity, 
accommodation, and balancing salutary and deleterious effects) to cases 
dealing with freedom of expression.82  
Perhaps there is reason to continue this limited application of the 
Dagenais/Mentuck test. The third part of the test, which is similar to the 
last stage of the Oakes analysis, lends itself to a consideration of broader 
considerations than the content and scope of the rights involved. This 
may result in a balancing of rights (i.e., looking at factors to decide 
which right in this context will predominate) as opposed to reconciling 
rights. Such broader considerations may be more appropriate in cases 
dealing with freedom of expression, which will necessarily impact more 
than just the parties involved. However, in cases where the conflict is 
more evidently limited to two individuals, such broader considerations 
may distract from the purpose of the analysis. This proposal for the 
limitation of the Dagenais framework may find some support in 
Iacobucci J.’s “Reconciling Rights”. In his discussion of the Dagenais 
framework, he notes that where the court is attempting to reconcile 
Charter rights in a manner that addresses “broader, social purposes”, the 
analysis required is “more holistic and approximates a section 1 
analysis”.83 Implicit in this argument may be the corollary point that 
more intimate conflicts also require a different approach. TWU and 
B. (R.), two of the examples of reconciliation noted above that deal with 
more personal rights, use the principles of Dagenais but do not make use 
of the tripartite test. 
3. The Practical Impact 
The majority decision’s failure to examine the context to determine 
the content and limits of the accused’s rights to full defence and a fair 
trial may also be correlated to some of the problematic practical 
implications of its decision. Because the majority did not focus on 
determining the limits of the rights at play in the conflict, it did not fully 
appreciate the context. In particular, the implications of its decision 
                                                                                                             
82 See, for example: Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [2002] S.C.J. 
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suggest that the Court did not appreciate the additional hardships that the 
decision would place on witnesses in NS’s position.  
(a) Increased Procedural Burdens for Witnesses 
In striving to balance the rights at play in N.S., the majority’s 
proposed solution increases the procedural burdens placed on witnesses. 
This will likely make it necessary that a complainant in such 
circumstances seek the assistance of counsel to guide them through the 
byzantine court process. This point was appreciated by LeBel J., who 
noted in his concurring reasons that the application of the criteria 
established by the majority “could trigger new motions, and possibly 
another type of ‘voir dire’ that would add a new layer of complexity to a 
trial process that is not always a model of simplicity …”.84 
Further, the majority’s test requires that complainants take an 
active role if they wish to testify with their niqabs. Although the 
accused would seem to bear the burden in this test (with the exception 
of establishing sincerity of religious belief), the complainants are 
expected to place evidence before the court relating to possible 
options for accommodation.85 This would effectively require that the 
complainant not only be prepared to produce expert evidence on the 
effect of demeanour evidence at trial, but also be prepared to counter 
the evidence brought forward by the accused. Without the assistance 
of counsel, it is impractical to believe that a person without a legal 
background would be adequately prepared to handle such burdens. 
Further, the effective evidentiary burden that the majority’s reasons 
place on a complainant seems onerous given that at the Supreme 
Court none of the nine interveners was able to provide any social 
science evidence on the impact of demeanour evidence.86 This would 
suggest that no such evidence exists in Canada, leaving the 
complainant in the improbable situation of having to commission this 
evidence herself. 
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(b) The Need to Prove Strength of Religious Beliefs 
A second problematic aspect of the majority decision is its 
requirement in the last stage of the Dagenais test that courts consider the 
strength of the witness’s religious belief. As Abella J. noted, it is not clear 
how this assessment is consistent with the witness’s rights, particularly 
given the “highly subjective and imprecise nature of the freedom of 
religion analysis”.87 This would also seem to contradict Dagenais’s 
holding that the court respect both sets of rights in resolving an apparent 
conflict.88  
More practically, given the context in which this analysis would take 
place — at a provincial court, likely with a witness who is without 
counsel (as NS initially was) — this test risks a descent into the 
“inquisition”-type examinations that the Supreme Court prohibited in 
Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem.89 This is even more troubling given the 
fact that the majority did not provide any guidance regarding how such 
an assessment would be undertaken. As Abella J. noted in the context of 
the sincerity analysis, it is unclear what evidence a court would look to in 
assessing the strength of a witness’s beliefs.90 Judging from the transcript 
of the voir dire in N.S., where the preliminary inquiry judge dealt with 
his manner of questioning NS, whether she would have counsel and 
whether she would be sworn in an ad hoc manner, this is likely to result 
in a disorienting process for the witness.91 This in turn, puts an additional 
burden on a witness in NS’s position, a factor which the majority did not 
truly consider (or did not attach enough weight to). 
(c) Access to Justice 
In light of the above, as well as other factors, the majority’s decision 
creates substantial access to justice issues for complainants in NS’s 
circumstances. Although the majority did note some of the access to justice 
issues that persons such as NS may encounter if ordered to remove their 
niqabs, only Abella J. explicitly connected this to defining the accused’s 
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right to a fair trial, quoting the following dicta from Mills: “[A]n assessment 
of the fairness of the trial process must be made ‘from the point of view of 
fairness in the eyes of the community and the complainant’.”92 
Forcing women who sincerely believe that their religion requires them 
to wear a niqab in public to remove it may result in these women not 
bringing charges for crimes that they allege have been committed against 
them. This will create an inhibition to seek justice that will “undermine the 
public perception of fairness” of the justice system.93 This effect is likely 
to be more marked among Muslims, who as a marginalized community are 
more likely to have a pre-existing perception that the justice system will 
treat them unfairly.94 
V. CONCLUSION 
As the adage goes, context matters. However, as the Supreme Court’s 
decision in N.S. demonstrates, the purpose that context is used for is critical. 
In contrast to the prior case law, the Supreme Court did not use context to 
determine the content and scope of the rights at play in this case. As a result, 
the Court ended up balancing the competing rights in N.S. (notwithstanding 
that they used the language of reconciliation). Although this is conceptually 
problematic and risks the coherency of the Charter, as this paper suggests, it 
may also have led to practical problems with the decision.  
POSTSCRIPT 
In Fall 2011, this case was re-heard by the preliminary inquiry judge, 
who applied the four factors articulated by the Supreme Court of 
Canada.95 The preliminary inquiry judge held that NS must remove her 
niqab while testifying. In reaching this conclusion, he applied the 
“reconciling rights” framework as follows. 
Sincere Religious Belief: NS testified as to her religious beliefs. She 
described wearing the niqab as a “matter of respect, honour and 
modesty”. NS stated that removing the niqab in public would be 
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“sinning” but she does do so to participate in society, including when 
taking her driver’s licence and passport photos and when required by 
government officials. The preliminary inquiry judge held that NS’s 
“religious beliefs are of long duration, and are an important part of who 
she is as a human being”. He concluded that NS “sincerely believes” that 
her religion requires her to wear a niqab during the trial.96 
Trial Unfairness: Neither party led any evidence to rebut the 
“common law assumption” that the accused will see his or her accuser’s 
face. As such, the preliminary inquiry judge, given the Supreme Court’s 
strong pronouncements, held that allowing NS to testify with a niqab 
would impair the defendants’ counsel’s ability to assess her credibility. 
And, in the court’s view, the case depended on NS’s credibility.97 
Reconciliation: According to the court’s reasons, the only option 
proposed by NS’s counsel to reconcile these two rights was a one-way 
screen, similar to those used in child assault cases. The court noted that 
this option did not assist because the purpose of the screen is to shield the 
witness from seeing others in the courtroom. One of the defendant’s 
counsel proposed that NS testify by close-circuit television. NS refused, 
viewing this as still creating “a sexualized atmosphere”. The court also 
rejected the option of excluding men from the courtroom on the basis 
that the court cannot bar male members of the public or media from 
attending the trial, and the defendants are entitled to choose their 
counsel. As a result, the preliminary inquiry judge concluded that “no 
accommodation or alternative measures are possible”.98 
Proportionality: Given the Supreme Court’s reasons, the outcome on 
this issue was predetermined: the accused’s right to a fair trial trumped 
NS’s religious freedoms. The preliminary inquiry judge attempted to 
identify the competing interests, but ultimately concluded that NS has to 
remove her niqab.99 NS’s counsel advised that she intends to appeal the 
decision.100
                                                                                                             
96 Id., at paras. 4-8. 
97 Id., at paras. 9-12. 
98 Id., at paras. 13-15. 
99 Id., at paras. 16-27. 
100 Michele Mandel, “Woman in sex assault case must remove niqab to testify, judge rules”, 
cnews (April 24, 2013), online: Canoe <http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Crime/2013/04/24/ 
20766356.html>. 

